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Abstract 
The paper studies a regional environmental tax reform in a federal state. A region 
unilaterally improves the environmental quality by increasing its energy taxes. The 
regional government recycles the excess tax revenues by lowering either pre-existing 
distorting labor or capital taxes. This regional tax reform causes a vertical tax 
externality in the federal budget.  We show how the nature of this externality depends 
on the environmental goal, the tax-recycling scenario, the initial local and federal tax 
shares, and the relative importance of the reforming region in the federal state. 
Simulations illustrate the effects for Belgium and US.  
Keywords: Tax Reform; Vertical Tax Externality; Federalism   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Governments increasingly share their competences in environmental and fiscal matters 
with other government levels. These multi-level governments may arise from 
decentralization (e.g. Belgium and Spain) or from voluntary cooperation between 
regions and nations (e.g. Germany, US and EU). In a federal state, regional policy 
typically affects the federal government (and vice versa). We show how environmental 
policy causes vertical externalities to the other government levels. 
      The paper studies a regional environmental tax reform in a federal state. One region 
increases its energy tax and recycles the excess tax revenues by lowering distorting 
labor or capital taxes. This tax reform may improve or deteriorate the non-
environmental efficiency of the regional tax system. We show that the vertical 
externality depends on the improvement in environmental quality, the recycling of the 
tax revenues, the local and federal shares in the overall tax rate, and the number of 
regions. The theoretical results are illustrated with simulations for Belgium (2 regions) 
and the US (50 regions). 
The paper combines the tax reform literature with fiscal federalism. In the early 
nineties, economists argued that substituting environmental taxes for pre-existing 
distorting taxes may yield a “double dividend” i.e. not only a cleaner environment but 
also a less distorting way of raising revenue (for an overview see Goulder, 1995). More 
recent literature describes the conditions under which environmental taxes exacerbate 
rather than alleviate tax distortions (see e.g. de Mooij and Bovenberg, 1998). 
A large share of literature on federalism deals with horizontal tax competition for 
mobile production factors. In a model with mobile capital, immobile labor and 
environmental quality, Oates and Schwab (1988) show that environmental quality can 
be set optimally if there are no spillovers and if non-distorting taxes finance the budget. 
When distorting capital taxes are present, the regions set the capital tax ratio and the 
environmental quality too low in order to attract capital. Higher capital tax ratios and 
better environmental quality not only reduce output, the capital tax base also erodes and 
the regional government foregoes tax revenues. The regional government however does 
not take into account that the local tax base erosion increases the tax base of other 
regions. The social cost of local public goods or environmental quality is lower than the 
private cost. Hence, the capital tax level and environmental quality are set inefficiently 
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Vertical tax competition arises when different levels of government (i.e. federal and 
regional governments) co-occupy the same tax base. The tax imposed by one 
government level diminishes the tax base available to the other level. These vertical 
interactions are complex to study and the results depend heavily on the relations 
between the government levels. Up to now, they have received relatively little attention 
from economists and are usually neglected in environmental policy (for an overview, 
see Keen, 1998). 
In section 2 we establish the model. We extend de Mooij and Bovenberg (1998) by 
adding a regional/federal dimension. Section 3 explains the welfare effects. Section 4 
analyzes theoretically the model for a local labor tax cut and a local capital tax cut. The 
simulations of section 5 illustrate the theoretical results. We conclude in section 6. 
2.  MODEL 
2.1.  Structure of the Model 
Each federal state is the result of a unique historical process. The competences of 
government levels differ significantly across federal states. Therefore we use a highly 
stylized model. Our model describes a federal government, ruling over N regions. The 
regions are small open economies (S.O.E.). They face fixed world prices for perfectly 
mobile commodities. In each region we find a regional government, a representative 
household and a representative firm. 
      The federal and regional governments co-occupy the same tax bases, i.e. both 
government levels tax the three input factors: labor income ( 
L T ), capital (
K T ), and 
energy (
E T ). The three local taxes can differ inter-regionally, whereas the three federal 
taxes are uniform across regions. Labor is assumed to be immobile. Capital and energy 
are perfectly mobile. The model distinguishes three types of public goods: 
environmental quality, local public good and federal public good. The local public good 
and local environmental quality do not have any transboundary effects. The federal 
government supplies a single federal public good in all regions. 
      We assume that initially all regions are symmetric. The initial levels of production 
factors and local taxes are identical across regions. The paper investigates the welfare 
effects in all regions when one region deviates from the initial equilibrium by reforming 
its environmental tax policy
2. The model is medium-run static as we do not include 
growth or accumulation nor do we account for short run adjustments. Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  5
Table 1: The Model 
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Profits  0( 1 )( 1 ) ( 1 )
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Labor Supply  1
i
Si LV = −   (10) 
  Regional Government   
Regional Government Budget Constraint 
LK E
ii i ii ii i GT W LT KT E =+ +   (11) 
Regional Labor-Market Equilibrium 
S
ii LL =   (12) 
Regional Environmental Quality  () ii M gE =   (13) 
Regional Walras Law: Balance of Payments 
** () ( )
i
iii ii ii T o F YCG KK EE G =++ − + − +   (14) 
  Federal Government   
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iL K E
ToF F i i F i F i GT W L T K T E =+ +   (15) 
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Endogenous variables   ,,, , ,, , , , , , ,  o r  
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** ,,,,,,,,, a n d   o r  
L KELKE E K L
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 Market wage rate in region i i W =  
 Labour supply in region i
S
i L =  
Environmental quality in region i i M =
 Private consumption in region i i C =  
 Leisure in region i i V =  
 Output in region i i Y =  
 Labour demand in region i i L =  
Energy demand in region i i E =  
 Capital demand in region i i K =  
*  Regional endowment of capital i K =  
*  Regional endowment of energy i E =  
 
   
Federal public good F G =  
Local public good in region i i G =  
Payment of region i 
          to federal government
i
ToF G =  
Lagrange multiplier of the
       household budget constraint
        in region i
      (= marginal utility of income)
i λ =
 
    
Local ad-valorem tax
        on labour income
L
i T =  
Local ad-valorem tax





i T =  
Federal ad-valorem 
        tax on labour income
L
i T =  
Federal ad-valorem 
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(a)  Firms 
Firm behavior is described by the representative firms. All firms produce an identical 
commodity. The constant return to scale production function with perfect competition 
reduces a firm’s profit to zero (1). We use three inputs: labor ( i L ), clean capital ( i K ) and 
energy ( i E ). The mobile factors, capital and energy, face fixed world market prices. 
Normalization sets prices of capital, energy, and output to one. Solving the 
maximization problem gives the implicit demand functions for labor (3), clean capital (4
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(b)  Households 
The representative household maximizes a homothetic utility function (6), subject to a 
budget constraint (7). This household budget consists of after-tax labor income (
i
iS WL ), 
and the domestic endowments of energy (
*
i E ) and capital (
*
i K ). We distinguish three 
public goods in the utility function, namely, environmental quality ( i M ), local public 
good ( i G ), and federal public good ( F G ). The household optimizes by choosing the level 
of leisure ( i V ) and consumption ( i C ). The utility function has a weakly separable form, 
as public goods do not affect private demand for consumption and leisure. The three 
public goods are exogenously given from the household’s perspective. Equations (8) 
and (9) represent the implicit functions for labor supply and consumption demand. We 
normalize the time endowment to one (10). 
(c)  Regional Government 
The regional government supplies a local public good ( i G ), which is financed by local 
taxes on labor (
L
i T ), capital (
K
i T ), and energy (
E
i T ) (11).  The tax reform is budget 
neutral for the regional government, as the excess tax revenues of the environmental tax 
are used to reduce local labor or capital taxes. The tax reform does not affect the local 
taxes and tax bases of the non-reforming regions. The tax reform is budget neutral for 
them as well. 
(d)  Federal Government 
The federal taxes on labor (
L
F T ), capital (
K
F T ), and energy (
E
F T ) finance the supply of the 
single federal public good ( F G ). The tax reform changes the tax bases of the federal 
government in region  j . With unchanged federal taxes, the regional tax reform affects 
the tax revenues of the federal government (15 and 16). The reform causes a vertical tax 
externality to federal government. The regional tax reform influences the welfare of all 
regions through the federal budget.  
(e)  Labor-Market Equilibria, Environment and Balance of Payments 
Equation (12) represents the regional labor market clearing. With regionally immobile 
labor, the federal labor market clearing is redundant. Equation (13) formalizes the 
inverse relationship between the energy
3 demand and the environmental quality. The 
regional Walras law combines the output (1), the implicit demand function for clean Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  7
capital (4), the household budget constraint (7) and the regional budget constraint (11). 
The federal Walras Law is redundant as it is the sum of all regional Walras Laws.  
Table 2: Linearized Model 
  Firms   
Domestic Output          LK E
ii i i ii i YLKE ωω ω =+ +  (17) 
Energy Demand             ** * ()
ii i i ii
L KE
ii i i i i EL EK EE EL WT T T εε ε =− + − −   (18) 
Capital Demand             ** * ()
ii i i ii
L KE
ii i i i i KL KK KE K LW T TT εε ε =− + − −   (19) 
Non-Profit Condition         0( )
L KE LK E
ii i i ii i WT T T ωω ω =+ ++   (20) 
  Households   
Household Budget Constraint        (1 )( )
CL L L
i ii ii i F i CL W ωω θ θ =− − +  (21) 
Labor Supply     
ii
S
i i LL LW η =   (22) 
  Regional Government   
Regional Government Budget Constraint                  ()
L KE GL L LK K K E E E
ii i i i i ii ii i ii i i i i i GW L T K T E T ωθ ω ωθ ωω θ ωω =+ + ++ + +   (23) 
Regional Labor-Market Equilibrium    
S
ii LL =   (24) 
Regional Environmental Quality     
ii i M E γ =−   (25) 
Regional Walras Law: Balance of Payments              (1 ) (1 )
i CG E E E K K K G
ii i ii ToF ii i F i i i F i i T o F i YCG E K G ωω θ θ ω θ θ ωω =++ − − + − − +   (26) 
  Federal Government   
Regional Payment to Federal Government                 
iL K E GL L L L L K K K E E E
iF i F i F ToF i ToFi Fi i Fi i i Fi i i Fi i i GL W T K T E T ωθ ω θ ω ω θ ω ω θ ω ω =+ + + + ++   (27) 
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(28) 
Endogenous variables                           
i
ToF ,,,,,,,,, , , , T  o r  T
SL K
iii i i i j j Fi i i j GYL EK LC WMG G π −    
Exogenous variables                     
**
; T0  o r  T 0 ; TTT0 ; TTT0 ; 0 ; G 0
EK L L K E L K E
j j j F iF iF i j j j ii j TK E −−− = = === === = = =    
Parameters 
*
ab ε = Uncompensated direct or indirect price elasticity of factor a 
with respect to the price b  ( ) ,, , iii ab L E K = in the model 
ii LL η = Uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply 
i γ = Elasticity that measures the effect of more  energy on 
environmental quality 
Taxes 
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2.2.  Linearization 
Table 2 contains the log-linearized model
4. Log-linearization around an initial 
equilibrium is commonly applied for economic analysis of (small) tax reforms. The 
regional budget of the reforming region is exogenous as the tax reform is budget neutral 
(   0 j G = ). The domestic endowments for capital and energy are exogenous for all regions 
(   
**
0 ii KE == ). Equations (18) and (19) give the factor demand equations for energy and 
capital. Elasticities 
*
ab ε  ( ,, , iii ab L K E = ) represent the price elasticities of factor demand 
conditional on employment. As empirical evidence suggests a positive uncompensated Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  8
wage elasticity (
ii L L η ), higher after-tax wage rates ( i W ) boost employment (22) 
(Hausman, 1985).  
3.  WELFARE 
As shown in de Mooij and Bovenberg (1998), the marginal excess burden (   β ) measures 
the welfare effects of a regional environmental tax reform. It is defined as the 
compensating variation (CV) divided by the output (30). The compensating variation is 
the additional transfer that keeps the household at its initial utility level. A positive 
excess burden indicates a welfare loss.  
      Equation (29) disentangles the welfare change into the effects of the factor market 
distortions. The θs stand for tax distortions or willingness to pay for environment or 
public goods. The first term shows that, with positive labor taxes, employment yields a 
welfare-gain. The labor taxes imply a wedge between the marginal social benefit of 
employment and the marginal social opportunity cost. The workers are not only 
compensated for giving up their leisure, but employment also yields public revenues. 
Similarly, the second term shows a wedge between the marginal social benefit and cost 
of capital demand. Hence, higher capital demand raises welfare. The third term 
represents the environmental factor. If total taxes on pollution (
E E
j Fj θ θ + ) are larger than 
the marginal environmental damage (
P
Ej θ ) then higher pollution increases welfare. The 
fourth term reflects the effect of the federal public good. If    
j j GG G
F ToF jF j T o F j GG θω ω > , the 
relative increase in the supply of the federal public good is larger than the increase in 
the federal tax revenues paid by region j. In this case, the welfare of region j improves.  
      ()      ( ) ()( ) ()
j LL L KK K EE P E G G G
jj j FT o F j F j j Fj j j Fj Ej j j Fj ToFj j LK E G G βθ θ ω θ θ ω θ θ θ ωθ ωω ⎡ ⎤ = − + + ++ + −+− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
      (29)  


























=   (32) 
       
F                       -        (1 )      -                     
          environmental               private non-environmental      federal public non-environmental    
PE L L L GG
j j Ej j j Fj j j Fj j EW G βθ ω θ θ ω θ ω =− −
    
(33)  
  
F        
          federal public non-environmental
GG
jF j j G βθ ω −− − =− (34) 
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Equation (33) represents an alternative notation for the marginal excess burden in 
the reforming region. It consists of three components: the environmental welfare, the 
private non-environmental welfare, and the federal public non-environmental welfare. 
The regional budget does not change in any of the regions (   0 i G = ). 
The regional tax reform in j does not affect the factor markets and the contributions 
to the federal level of the non-reforming regions. The tax reform in region  j  influences 
the welfare of the non-reforming regions only through the supply of federal public good 
(34). 
(a)  Environmental welfare 
The first term of equation (33) expresses the change in environmental welfare in region 
j. 
P
Ej θ  represents the marginal social damage from pollution. An environmental tax 
reform typically reduces the demand for energy. 
(b)  Private non-environmental welfare 
The private non-environmental welfare is related to the efficiency of the tax system as a 
revenue-raising device. An efficient tax system implies a lower tax burden on its agents. 
This boosts the after-tax wages and, hence, welfare.  
A higher local energy tax decreases the energy demand, as energy supply is 
infinitely elastic. Similarly, the energy-poor economy attracts less capital. The marginal 
productivities of capital and energy remain equal to the world market price, but the 
marginal productivity of labor decreases. It is said that the incidence of the local energy 
tax falls on the immobile factor, labor.  Similarly, the tax incidence of the local capital 
tax falls also on the immobile factor. The incidences of the tax that is increased (i.e. the 
local energy tax) and the taxes that are reduced (i.e. the local labor tax or local capital 
tax) are borne by immobile labor. 
With zero local non-labor taxes ( 0
EK
jj θθ = = ), taxes are equally efficient instruments 
to raise revenues. The local tax system is optimal from a non-environmental point of 
view. A marginal change in the local tax system does not yield any first-order effect on 
private welfare. 
The capital and energy taxes do not only distort the labor market, but also distort 
the markets for capital and energy. With initially positive local non-labor taxes 
( 0
E
j θ > , 0
K
j θ > ), the regional government foregoes energy tax revenues and capital tax Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  10
revenues, due to the erosion of the energy tax base and the capital tax base. From a non-
environmental point of view, the explicit labor tax is a more efficient instrument for 
raising public revenues as it distorts only the labor market. As in de Mooij and 
Bovenberg (1998), we call these two tax erosion effects, respectively, the tax burden 
effect and the negative tax shifting effect. Under particular conditions, however, the tax 
reform may expand the capital tax base, creating a private welfare benefit, the positive 
tax shifting effect. 
Whether the tax reform reduces or expands the capital tax base depends on the 
recycling of the excess tax revenues. Tax recycling counteracts the decrease in capital, 
labor and energy demand, but the offsetting effect depends on the choice between a 
local labor tax cut and a local capital tax cut. As capital is perfectly mobile, the optimal 
capital tax is zero. The optimal tax for immobile labor, however, is positive. In the real 
world, with positive distorting taxes on labor and capital, one can say that capital is 
overtaxed and labor is undertaxed. 
    A local labor tax cut favors the undertaxed factor. The tax recycling has only a 
limited effect as labor supply is relatively inelastic compared to capital. The labor 
demand slightly increases and the economy in region j attracts only slightly more capital 
and energy. This counteracts but does not typically offset the previous erosion of capital 
and energy tax bases. With initially positive energy and capital taxes, the economy of 
region j suffers from a tax burden effect and a negative tax shifting effect. These effects 
lower the regional wages and therefore also the private non-environmental welfare. The 
tax burden effect and the negative tax shifting effect are the private costs for a cleaner 
environment. 
If region j reduces the local tax on capital, it favors the overtaxed factor. The capital 
tax cut counteracts the previous decrease in capital demand due to the higher energy tax. 
If the counteraction does not completely offset the capital tax base erosion we still find 
a negative tax shifting effect. But, under some conditions, the capital tax base erosion is 
overcompensated and the environmental tax reform expands the local capital tax base. 
With an initially positive local capital tax, we get a positive tax shifting effect. The 
capital expansion also boosts the demand for energy and labor. This higher demand 
counteracts but, typically, does not completely offset the tax base erosion caused by 
higher local energy taxes. The environmental benefit and tax burden effect remain. The 
private non-environmental welfare improves if the positive tax shifting effect dominates Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  11
the tax burden effect. If an improvement in environmental quality goes together with a 
higher private non-environmental welfare, we find a double dividend.       
(c)  Federal Public non- environmental welfare 
The federal public non-environmental welfare is present in equation (33) for the 
reforming region j and in equation (34) for the non-reforming regions. 
G
j θ  is the 
willingness to pay for the federal public good. The regional tax reform changes the tax 
bases of the federal taxes in the reforming region.  
Section 4 shows that the magnitude and sign of change in public non-environmental 
welfare depends on the environmental goal, the way of tax recycling of the excess tax 
revenues, the local and federal share in the overall tax rate, and the number of regions. 
A positive vertical tax externality increases the federal budget. Region j exports part of 
its non-environmental welfare gain to the non-reforming regions. Similarly, a negative 
vertical tax externality decreases the federal budget. The non-reforming regions pay for 
the environmental quality in the reforming region. 
4.  ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND TAX RECYCLING 
In this section we analyze the welfare effects for tax reforms recycling the tax revenues 
through local labor or capital taxes. Section 4.1 explains the general equilibrium 
elasticities in Table 4 and Table 5. Section 4.2 calculates the welfare effects when the 
regional government recycles the excess tax revenues through the local labor tax. 
Section 4.3 does the same for the local capital tax. The reduced-form coefficients for 
wage, energy demand, and federal budget in Table 4 and Table 5 correspond, 
respectively, with the private welfare, the environmental dividend and the vertical tax 
externality. Table 6 summarizes the welfare effects of both scenarios. 
4.1.  General Equilibrium Elasticities 
Table 3 lists the general equilibrium elasticities. 
jj E E Γ  and 
jj K E Γ represent the effects on, 
the energy/labor and capital/labor ratios when the government cuts the local labor tax. 
In the case of a capital tax cut, these ratios are given by, respectively, 
jj jj E EK E Γ− Γ and 
jj jj K KE K Γ− Γ. 
jj E E Γ  reflects the effect on the energy/labor ratio with a higher energy price (
*
ii E E ε ) 
and a lower labor price (
*
ii E L ε ). The higher energy price induces input substitution away 
from energy towards labor. Moreover, output declines as the regional tax reform shifts Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  12
the tax burden from the relatively inelastic factor towards the infinitely elastic factor. 
The negative output effect reinforces the substitution effect and the general equilibrium 
elasticity is unambiguously positive (i.e. 0
jj EE Γ > ). A high elasticity corresponds with a 
strong decline in pollution. From a non-environmental point of view the regional and 
federal governments forego tax revenues, causing tax burden effects.  
jj K E Γ  measures the capital/labor ratio effect of a higher energy price (
*
ii K E ε ) and a 
lower labor price (
*
ii K L ε ). Two counteracting effects can be observed. On the one hand, 
higher environmental tax substitutes capital for energy. On the other hand, output 
declines, decreasing the capital demand. In the normal case, the adverse output effect 
dominates the positive substitution effect ( 0
jj KE Γ >  and  0
jj EK Γ > ), giving a negative tax 
shifting effect. In the exceptional case, the substitution effect dominates the adverse 
output effect ( 0
jj KE Γ<  and  0
jj EK Γ< ), leading to a positive tax shifting effect. 
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jj jj E EK E Γ− Γ measures the effect on the energy/labor ratio when energy price 
increases (
*
ii E E ε ) and capital price decreases (
*
ii E K ε ). In the normal case, the tax reform 
leads to a decrease in energy demand ( 0
jj jj EE KE Γ −Γ > ). The tax burden effect decreases 
private welfare. In the exceptional case, the regional tax reform increases the 
energy/labor ratio ( 0
jj jj EE KE Γ− Γ< ). Here, the positive output effect dominates the 
negative substitution effect. De Mooij and Bovenberg (1998) explain that this happens 
when capital is a better substitute for labor than energy. 
jj jj K KE K Γ− Γ represents the effect on the capital/labor ratio with a lower capital price 
(
*
ii K K ε ) and a higher energy price (
*
ii K E ε ). The regional tax reform reduces the tax burden 
on capital in the normal case ( 0
jj jj KK EK Γ− Γf ). The capital tax base expands, inducing a Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  13
positive tax shifting effect. In the exceptional case, the capital tax base erodes 
( 0
jj jj KK EK Γ− Γp ), causing a negative tax shifting effect. Here, the negative output effect 
dominates the substitution effect. This happens when energy is a much better substitute 
for labor than capital. The regional tax reform shifts the tax burden from the relative 
inelastic factor (capital) towards the elastic factor (energy). 
4.2.  Reducing Labor taxes 
When initial local taxes on labor and capital are zero, the regional tax reform does 
not affect the private welfare (47). With positive initial taxes, the tax reform lowers the 
private welfare in the normal case ( 0
ii EE Γ f  and  0
ii EK Γ f ). The higher the initial local 
taxes, the more the private welfare declines. In the exceptional case ( 0
ii EE Γ f  and 
0
ii EK Γ p ), the private welfare improves when the effect of 
jj E K Γ  dominates 
jj E E Γ . In the 
normal case, the tax reform improves the environmental quality (49). Only if 
jj E K Γ  
dominates 
jj E E Γ  in the exceptional case, does the environment deteriorate with higher 
environmental taxes. The first and second column of Table 6 show that there is (almost) 
no scope
5 for a double dividend in the reforming region as private welfare and 
environmental welfare have an opposite sign. 
 Table 4: Reduced-form coefficients reducing labor tax:   
L
j T   
 
E




j j L W ∆   ( ) jj jj
E KE
jE E jE K j θ θω −Γ+Γ   (47) 
Labor   
j
j L L ∆   ( ) jj jj j j
E KE






j L E ∆   ( ) ( ) jj jj j j j jj
EK E
LL j EE j EK j L EE ηθ θ ω −Γ + Γ + ∆ Γ   (49) 
Capital   
j
j L K ∆   ( ) ( ) jj jj j j j jj
EK E
LL j EE j EK j L KE ηθ θ ω −Γ + Γ + ∆ Γ   (50) 
Output   
j
j L Y ∆   ( ) ( ) jj j j j jj j j j
E KE





j F L G ∆  
() ( ) ( )
() () ( )
1 11
1
jj jj jj j jj
jj jj jj j j j
LL KK EE E E
Fj j L L Fj j L L Fj j L L j Fj L E E
E
j G
LL KK EE K K ToFj
Fj j L L Fj j L L Fj j L L j Fj L E K
N
θω η θωη θωη θ θ
ω
ω θω η θωη θωη θ θ
⎡ ⎤ ++ + + ∆ Γ ⎢ ⎥
− ⎢ ⎥




Consumption   
j j L C ∆   () ( ) (1 ) 1
jj jj j j
L
j L LE K E
jF j L Lj E E j E K j C
j
ω
θ θ η θθ ω
ω
−− − + Γ + Γ   (53) 
( ) ( ) 10
jj j
LL E E L L K K
Lj j L L j j j j j j θω η θ ω θ ω θ ω ∆=− − + + f  
In the normal case, the federal budget unambiguously decreases after a tax reform 
(52). The tax reform decreases welfare in the non-reforming regions. The reforming Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  14
region exports a part of its non-environmental efficiency costs to the other regions. In 
the exceptional case, however, the federal budget may increase or decrease, depending 
on general equilibrium elasticities and initial local and federal taxes. 
4.3.  Reducing capital taxes 
The private welfare does not change if the initial local capital and energy taxes are 
equal to zero (54).  In the normal case, the tax burden effect ( 0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γf ) and the 
positive tax shifting effect ( 0
ii ii KK EK Γ− Γf ) counteract each other. Private welfare may 
improve or deteriorate. If  0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γf / 0
ii ii KK EK Γ −Γ p , private welfare unambiguously 
deteriorates, whereas if  0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γp / 0
ii ii KK EK Γ− Γf , private welfare unambiguously 
improves. 
Table 5: Reduced-form coefficients reducing capital tax:   
K
i T  
 
E




j j K W ∆ ( ) ( ) ( ) jj jj jj jj
EK E
jE E K E jK K E K j θ θω −Γ − Γ− Γ − Γ   (54) 
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A double dividend appears when the positive tax shifting effect (
jj jj K KE K Γ− Γ) 
dominates the tax burden effect (
jj jj E EK E Γ −Γ ) for the private welfare (54) but not for 
environmental quality (56). A double dividend never appears in the exceptional cases: 
the private welfare either improves at the expense of the environment or a better 
environment deteriorates the private welfare. 
Equation 59 shows that the federal tax revenues depend on general equilibrium 
elasticities, initial local and federal taxes, and the relative importance of the reforming Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  15
region in the federal state. In the normal case, the regional tax reform has an ambiguous 
effect on the federal budget. It may increase or decrease. With  0
jj jj EE KE Γ −Γ f  and   
0
jj jj KK EK Γ− Γp , we get a negative tax externality. The reforming region partially exports 
its costs for a cleaner environment to the other regions. It tends to oversupply 
environmental quality. If  0
jj jj EE KE Γ− Γp  and  0
jj jj KK EK Γ− Γf , the reforming region 
exports a part of its positive private welfare to the other regions. The reforming region 
is inclined to allow for too much pollution. 
The last three columns of Table 6 summarize the welfare effects for the normal case 
(i.e.  0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γf  and  0
ii ii KK EK Γ− Γf )  and  two exceptional cases (i.e. 
0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γp / 0
ii ii KK EK Γ− Γf and  0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γf / 0
ii ii KK EK Γ− Γp ). The exceptional case 
0
jj jj EE KE Γ− Γp / 0
jj jj KK EK Γ− Γp  does not exist.  
Table 6: Welfare effects in region j reducing   
L
j T  or reducing   
K
j T  
5.  SIMULATIONS 
We illustrate the theoretical results with simulations for a small federal state (e.g. 
Belgium) and a large federal state (e.g. United States). We raise after-tax energy prices 
by 10%. We assume that the supply of capital is infinitely elastic. In the real world the 
supply of capital is more elastic in the long run than in the short run.  Therefore, these 
simulations can be interpreted as the long-run consequences of environmental tax 
reforms. The shares, taxes, and elasticities correspond roughly to most Western 
countries (see de Mooij and Bovenberg, 1998). These economies are characterized by a 
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j T  Reducing   
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ii ii EE KE Γ− Γf  (normal) 
0
ii ii KK EK Γ− Γf (normal) 
0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γf (normal) 
0
ii ii KK EK Γ− Γp (exceptional) 
0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γp (exceptional) 
0
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large share of labor income in GDP and large labor and capital taxes as compared to 
energy taxes. The labor income tax on a before-tax basis is 50% ( 1
L T = ). The capital 
income tax is set at one third for mobile capital ( 0.5
K T = ). The energy tax is set at about 
10% ( 0.1
E T = ). 
      The debate on the substitutability/complementarity between capital and energy calls 
for sensitivity analysis on the cross price elasticity of capital and energy demand. 
Therefore, we run the model three times. The base run uses 
* 0.02
ii KE ε =−  and 
* 0.04
ii EK ε =− . 
In the second run we assume that  i K  and  i E  are better substitutes (
* 0.1
ii KE ε =−  and 
* 0.2
ii EK ε =− ). The third run assumes that  i K  and  i E  are poorer substitutes (
* 0.06
ii KE ε =  and 
* 0.12
ii EK ε = ). We assume that the marginal utility of the federal local public goods (61) 
and the marginal utility of environmental quality (62) equal the marginal utility of 
consumption in initial equilibrium, i.e. both public goods are provided at efficient level. 
i
FromF i G U λ =        (61) 
() M Ei UM λ − =      (62) 
      Belgium and the United States differ in two aspects. First, we assume that Belgium 
consists of two identical regions
6, whereas the US has 50 identical states. We consider 
them all to be small open economies
7.  Second, in the United States, the lower 
government levels
8 are responsible for about half of the total energy taxation. We 
estimate that the state’s tax shares in the US are 20%, 20% and 50% for respectively 
capital tax, labor tax and energy tax
9. In Belgium, the local tax shares are 20% for 
capital and 10% for both labor and pollution
10.  
5.1.  Small federal state: Belgium 
The base run with a local labor tax cut (first column Table 7) shows a positive 
environmental dividend in the reforming region with a decline of 6.47% in energy 
demand. Wage and employment decrease respectively with 0.02% and 0.01%, causing a 
negative non-environmental private welfare. There is no double dividend, but rather a 
trade-off between private and environmental welfare. Compared to labor, energy seems 
to be overtaxed from a non-environmental point of view. Moreover, regional 
environmental policy decreases the federal budget with 0.11%, causing a negative 
vertical tax externality. The overall welfare in the reforming region increases with 
0.54%. This is a trade-off of the private welfare, the environmental dividend, and the Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  17
vertical externality. The non-reforming region, however, suffers from a negative 
environmental tax externality and its welfare decreases by 0.04%.  
      In the case of a local capital tax cut (second column in Table 7), pollution decreases 
by 5.76% and capital demand is 4.32% higher. Wage and employment increase by 
0.08% and 0.02%, respectively. The positive tax shifting effect dominates the negative 
tax burden effect and we observe a double dividend. This suggests that in most Western 
countries capital is overtaxed compared to energy. Moreover, the tax reform brings 
about a positive vertical tax externality as the federal budget increases by 0.28%. The 
overall welfare in the reforming region and non-reforming regions improve by 0.66% 
and 0.11%, respectively.  
When capital and pollution are better substitutes (third and fourth column of Table 
7), substituting energy taxes for distorting taxes on labor or capital becomes more 
favorable from a non-environmental point of view. For a local labor tax cut, wage, 
employment and federal budget decrease less than in the base run. More capital is used 
after the tax reform thanks to the easier substitution between capital and energy. In the 
case of a local capital tax cut, wage, employment, capital demand and federal budget 
increase more than in the corresponding base run. The better substitution boosts the 
economy from a non-environmental point of view. 
Table 7: Effects of an increase in after-tax energy prices by 10% in Belgium 
Base run 
* 0.02
ii KE ε =−  and 
* 0.04
ii EK ε =−  
/ ii K E  better substitutes 
* 0.1
ii KE ε =−  and 
* 0.2
ii EK ε =−  
/ ii K E  poorer substitutes 
* 0.06
ii KE ε =  and 
* 0.12




i T  Lower 
K
i T  Lower 
L
i T  Lower 
K
i T  Lower 
L
i T  Lower 
K
i T  
Wage  -0.02 0.08  -0.002  0.10 -0.04 0.06 
Employment  -0.01 0.02  -0.0009  0.02 -0.02 0.01 
Pollution  -6.47 -5.76 -6.46 -6.52 -6.47 -4.98 
Capital  -0.77 4.32 0.04 5.17 -1.57 3.46 
Output  -0.75 0.07 -0.58 0.08 -0.91 0.06 
Federal  Budget -0.11 0.28 -0.05 0.34 -0.18 0.22 
Consumption  -0.01 0.06  -0.001  0.07 -0.02 0.04 
Welfare in region j  0.539  0.658  0.569  0.755  0.509  0.560 
Welfare  in  region  –j  -0.042 0.107 -0.018 0.130 -0.067 0.085 
        Poor substitution between capital and pollution (fifth and sixth column in Table 7) 
exacerbates the loss in wage, employment, capital demand and federal budget in case of 
a labor tax cut. With a capital tax cut, poor substitution curtails the gain in wage, 
employment, capital, and federal budget. The overall welfare in the reforming and the 
non-reforming region is better off when capital and energy are better substitutes. 
Similarly, their welfare decreases if capital and pollution are poorer substitutes. A better Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  18
substitution of capital and energy favors a regional environmental tax reform, while a 
poorer substitution between capital and energy limits the scope for cheap environmental 
improvement. 
5.2.  Large federal state: United States 
The results for the US in Table 8 are similar to those for Belgium. The environmental 
gain is similar. With a local labor tax cut, the regional tax reform deteriorates private 
and federal public non-environmental welfare. A capital tax cut boosts private welfare 
and federal budget. Better substitution between capital and pollution favors a cheap 
improvement of environmental quality. Poorer substitution worsens welfare. 
      Differences between American and Belgian results are due to the higher local share 
in the overall energy tax and the higher number of regions in the US. First, a high initial 
local environmental tax rate reinforces the tax burden effect on the regional level. With 
a labor tax cut, the wage and employment decrease more in the US than in Belgium. 
With a capital tax cut, the tax reform boosts the American wages and employment less 
than the Belgian. Second, as the number of regions is much higher in the US, the federal 
budget is less sensible to the policy of a single region. A regional environmental tax 
reform in the US imposes a relatively smaller vertical tax externality. 
    Curiously, the welfare improvement in the reforming region in the US is higher 
than in Belgium for a labor tax cut. This is due to the fact that the provision of federal 
local public goods decreases relatively less in the US.  In the simulation, this effect 
outweighs the larger tax burden effect. Similarly, for a capital tax cut the welfare 
increase in the reforming region is smaller in the US due to the lower positive vertical 
tax effect and the larger tax burden.  
Table 8: Effects of an increase in after-tax energy prices by 10% for the US. 
Base run 
* 0.02
ii KE ε =−  
* 0.04
ii EK ε =−  
/ ii K E  better substitutes 
* 0.1
ii KE ε =−  
* 0.2
ii EK ε =−  
/ ii K E  poorer substitutes 
* 0.06
ii KE ε =  
* 0.12
ii EK ε =    
Lower 
L
i T  Lower 
K
i T  Lower 
L
i T  Lower 
K
i T  Lower 
L
i T  Lower 
K
i T  
Wage -0.06  0.05  -0.04  0.06  -0.08  0.04 
Employment -0.03  0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.03  0.007 
Pollution -6.48  -5.74  -6.48  -6.51  -6.49  -4.95 
Capital -0.78  4.21  0.02  5.06  -1.59  3.37 
Output -0.76  0.04  -0.60  0.05  -0.93  0.04 
Federal Budget  -0.004  0.01  -0.002  0.02  -0.007  0.01 
Consumption -0.04  0.03  -0.03  0.04  -0.05  0.03 
Welfare in region j  0.567  0.543  0.573  0.619  0.560  0.466 
Welfare in regions -j  -0.0015  0.004  -0.0005  0.0052  -0.0025  0.0034 Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  19
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Regions rarely take into account the effects of their policy on the budgets of the other 
government levels. A regional environmental tax reform can cause positive or negative 
vertical tax externalities to the federal government. This vertical tax externality 
influences the welfare of the neighboring regions through the supply of federal public 
goods. In this paper we show that the vertical externality depends on the improvement 
in environmental quality, the way the excess taxes are recycled, the local and federal 
share in the overall tax rate, and the number of regions.  
First, higher local energy taxes generally lead to higher environmental quality. The 
environmental tax reform erodes the tax base of both local and federal energy taxes, 
causing a tax burden effect on regional and federal levels. High local energy taxes 
enforce the negative tax burden effect. The simulations for Belgium and the US show 
that the regional economy responds better to a budget-neutral tax reform when the local 
energy tax is low. With positive federal energy taxes, the tax burden effect is a cost to 
the federal budget. Greater environmental progress leads to a more severe tax burden. 
Second, the regional tax reform may boost or erode the tax base of local and federal 
capital taxes. This depends on the way the excess energy tax revenues are recycled. A 
negative federal tax shifting effect exacerbates the negative tax burden effect, whereas a 
positive tax shifting effect counteracts or even offsets the tax burden effect. With 
positive federal capital taxes, the tax shifting effect is a cost or benefit to the federal 
level. 
Third, when the positive tax shifting effect dominates the negative tax burden effect 
at the regional level, the wages increase, leading to higher federal labor tax revenues. 
Decreasing wages entails a cost for the federal budget. 
Fourth, the federal budget responds better when the share of energy in the total 
federal tax revenues is low. Obviously, the effect of a regional tax reform also depends 
on the relative share of the reforming region in the federal state. The impact of a US 
state on the federal level is smaller than a Belgian region. 
With a negative tax externality, the reforming region partially exports its costs for 
cleaner environment to the other government level and, hence, to the other regions. The 
reforming region tends to oversupply environmental quality. With a positive tax Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  20
externality, the reforming region exports a part of its positive private welfare to the 
other regions. The reforming region is inclined to allow for too much pollution 
This conclusion has strong similarities with the concept of double marginalization. 
Tirole (1998) explains that double marginalization arises when multiple firms at 
different places in a supply chain have market power. They all use their market power to 
receive a positive margin on their product. If these firms are vertically integrated, the 
total margin is lower than the sum of margins in the disintegrated case. Future research 
should investigate whether this argument holds for a federal state too, where serial 
governments (e.g. local and federal government) may set their taxes or environmental 
quality too high. Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities  21
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8. ENDNOTES 
                                                       
* We thank the participants of EAERE 2004, Budapest and INFER 2004, Wuppertal. John Pezzey, 
Cynthia Lin, Edward Calthrop, Inge Mayeres and Stefan Boeters contributed with valuable comments to 
earlier versions. We are grateful to the Flemish Center of Expertise for Environmental Policy Sciences for 
financial support. 
2 We do not compute a Nash equilibrium. The reforming region is represented by  j .  All regions are 
represented by  { } 1,..., ,..., Ii N =  and  jI ∈ .  j −  represents the N-1 non-reforming regions. 
3 The model is also valid when energy is generalized to a polluting input factor. 
4 All variables are now denoted as    Z , representing  ln dZ or 
dZ
Z
, except for the tax ratios where   
E







TT ++  . 
5 Only in the very specific case if 
jj E K Γ  dominates 
jj E E Γ  in equation 47, but does not dominate in 
equation 49 is there a double dividend with a very small improvement of private welfare and 
environmental quality.  
6 The two regions in the model are Flanders and Wallonia/Brussels. In reality, Belgium consists of three 
heterogeneous regions Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Capital-Region, the last being a much smaller 
region. 
7 Although the United States as a whole are definitely not a small open economy, it is a reasonable 
assumption to treat most states like small open economies. Only four states have more than 13 million 
people: California, Florida, New York and Texas.  
8 States, provinces, municipalities 
9 US Census Bureau, 2000 
10 Anno 2005 
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